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Abstract
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, narrowing the
scope of protection under the federal Lanham Act for

>>

“reverse passing off.” “Reverse passing off” is derived from
the statutory language in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
prohibiting a “false designation of origin” that is likely to

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

cause consumer confusion and generally occurs where one
company puts forth another company’s product as its own. A
“reverse passing off” claim was also thought to be feasible
against one who misrepresented the source of the creative
or communicative work embodied in a product. In Dastar,
however, the Court limited the ability to bring a claim of
“reverse passing off” by narrowly defining the term “origin,”
holding that “origin” refers only to the source of the tangible
goods and not to the source of any idea, concept or
communication embodied in the tangible goods. Following
Dastar, several cases have further defined the scope of a
“reverse passing off” claim. This Article introduces the
concept of “reverse passing off” and then discusses the
impact of Dastar and its application in subsequent cases.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>

Prior to the decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century

Fox Film Corp. 2 , an originator of communicative or creative
works could bring a claim of “reverse passing off” against those
that had included the originator’s work in a commercial product
without accreditation. In Smith v. Montero, for example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a film
actor had a valid claim for “reverse passing off” when a film
distributor substituted the original actor’s name for another
name in the credits and advertising material of a film. 3 This
ability for the originator of a communicative or creative work to
bring a claim of “reverse passing off,” however, was foreclosed
by the decision in Dastar.
<2>

In Dastar, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must

show that a misrepresentation or false designation led to
confusion as to the origin of the “tangible goods” and not simply
confusion as to the origin of any underlying creative work when
bringing a valid claim of “reverse passing off.”4 For example, an
author would be unsuccessful when bringing a “reverse passing
off claim” if a company took the author’s underlying story, made
minor changes and then bound and sold the book under its own
label. In this case, there would be no confusion as to the origin
of the physical book, because the company is the “origin” of the
physical book. As a result, originators of creative works can no
longer bring a claim of “reverse passing off” for misattribution,
plagiarism or false authorship. 5 The particular work at issue in
Dastar had fallen into the public domain and therefore it was
unclear whether the decision would also apply to works that are
still protected under valid copyrights. 6 In addition, because the
work at issue in Dastar was of a communicative nature, it was
unclear whether the decision would also apply to noncommunicative works. Subsequent to Dastar, several cases have
interpreted the decision to apply both to goods not protected by
copyright, as well as to those under valid copyright protection.
In addition, courts have applied the bar against a “reverse
passing off” claim to non-communicative works. This Article
introduces the concept of “reverse passing off” and then
discusses how cases in the wake of Dastar have clarified and
solidified the narrowing of a “reverse passing off” claim.

REVERSE PASSING OFF
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<3>

A claim of “reverse passing off” finds its statutory support in

§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), of the federal Lanham Act. 7 The
Lanham Act generally provides protection for “persons engaged
in … commerce against unfair competition” and from the
“deceptive and misleading use of marks.” 8 Although the
majority of the Lanham Act addresses the use, registration and
infringement of trademarks, § 43(a) reaches beyond trademark
protection.9 Section 43(a) provides a cause of action against
anyone using a “false designation of origin” which is likely to
cause consumer confusion “as to the origin” of his or her
goods. 10
<4>

The most obvious form of “reverse passing off” occurs when

a person removes or obliterates the original trademark of
another, without authorization, before reselling goods produced
by someone else. 11 For example, Pepsi would be vulnerable to
a claim for “reverse passing off” if it stripped the Coca-Cola
label off a Coke product and then sold the product under a Pepsi
label. 12 This is distinguishable from “passing off” in which a
person sells his or her own goods under someone else’s label.
“Reverse passing off” can be accomplished either expressly13 or
impliedly. 14 Express passing-off occurs when the wrongdoer
actually replaces the original mark with a name of his or her
own choosing, whereas implied passing off occurs when the
good or service is simply stripped of its identifying mark and
sold in an unbranded state. 15

REVERSE PASSING OFF PRIOR TO DASTAR
<5>

Prior to the decision in Dastar, the Ninth Circuit in Smith v.

Montoro faced the issue of whether an actor had a valid claim
against a film distributor for substituting the actor’s name for
another name of its own choosing in the credits and advertising
material of a film. 16 The court reasoned that the distributor had
falsely designated or represented another actor as the originator
of the plaintiff’s performance. On a policy level, the court
recognized such conduct as wrongful because “it involves an
attempt to misappropriate or profit from another’s talents and
workmanships.” 17 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the
actor had a valid claim for “reverse passing off.”
<6>

The rationale in Montoro relies on the assumption that

“origin” within the meaning § 43(a) extends to the originator of
a creative or communicative work. The Supreme Court did not
accept this assumption with its decision in Dastar.
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DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP.
<7>

Twentieth Century Fox Film (“Fox”), a television series

producer, claimed that Dastar Corp. (“Dastar”) had violated §
43(a) of the Lanham Act by “reverse passing off” Fox’s original
television series, Crusade in Europe. In 1948, Fox had acquired
rights to produce a television series, Crusade in Europe, based
on General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s book released earlier that
year. 18 The series was protected under copyright until 1977,
when it fell into the public domain due to Fox’s failure to renew
the copyright.19 Subsequently, Dastar acquired copies of the
original series, made slight modifications and then began selling
the new version as Campaigns in Europe under its own name.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding of “reverse
passing off” and awarded Fox $1.5 million in damages. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a unanimous
decision. 20
<8>

The Supreme Court held that “origin,” in the context of §

43(a), refers only to the manufacturer or producer of the
physical goods and not to the creator of the underlying
intellectual property. As a result, Dastar was not liable for “any
false designation of origin” because Dastar was the “origin” of
the modified video series. In reaching this conclusion, the
Supreme Court relied on the plain meaning of “origin.” The
Court stated that “the most natural understanding of the ‘origin’
of ‘goods’ — the source of wares — is the producer of the
tangible product sold in the marketplace, in this case the
physical Campaigns videotape sold by Dastar.”21 In defining
“origin,” the Court focused on who produced the tangible
product, not on who created the underlying work embodied in
the good.
<9>

Furthermore, the Court recognized that if “origin” were

stretched to cover the origin of the underlying creative work, as
opposed to the source of wares, then that recognition would
lead to the creation of “a species of mutant copyright law that
limit’s the public’s federal right to copy and use expired
copyrights.” 22 For example, under such a statutory construction,
Fox would have perpetual protection through § 43(a) for the
content in its Crusade in Europe series, long after any copyrights
expired. Such a statutory construction would be contrary to the
clear mandate from Congress that copyright protections have a
fixed duration.
<10>

In addition, the Court recognized practical problems

associated with broadening the scope of the term “origin.” First,
the Court recognized that “figuring out who is in the line of
23
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‘origin’ would be no simple task.”

In the context of the

Crusade in Europe, much of the film was shot by the United
States Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of
Information and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada,
and unidentified Newsreel Pool Cameramen.24 The Court
recognized the impractically of determining such originators and
found that the Lanham Act does not require such a “search for
the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”25
<11>

Moreover, the Court recognized that manufactures, such as

Dastar, would be placed in a catch 22 if the definition of “origin”
were stretched to cover the underlying creative work. The
manufacturer would be liable for “reverse passing off” if it failed
to accredit the creator of the underlying work and in the
alternative would be liable for crediting the underlying creator if
the accreditation were regarded as implying the creator’s
sponsorship or approval of the work. 26 In sum, the Supreme
Court found ample support for strictly limiting the scope of
“origin” to “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered
for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in those goods.” 27 Essentially, this
has narrowed a “reverse passing off” claim to the act of
complete appropriation of another’s products, stripping off the
identifying marks and then selling the product as one’s own.

APPLICATION OF DASTAR
<12>

The ruling in Dastar significantly limits the ability to bring a

“reverse passing off” claim. The following cases illustrate recent
applications of Dastar and help define the scope of what
remains of a “reverse passing off” claim. For example, cases
following Dastar make it clear that the Dastar holding applies
both to works still under copyright protection as well as to those
that have fallen out of copyright. In addition, Dastar applies
outside the realm of communicative works, limiting the ability to
bring a “reverse passing off” claim against copying the
underlying concept or idea embodied in a non-communicative
good.

A. Software – General Universal Systems, Inc. v. Lee
<13>

In General Universal Systems Inc. v. Lee, the plaintiff,

General Universal Systems (“GUS”), argued that defendant HAL
had engaged in “reverse passing off” by copying and marketing
GUS’s copyrighted freight tracking software as HAL’s own. 28
GUS developed a software program designed for use in the
freight forwarding and shipping industry and then licensed that
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software to Lopez, a GUS client, retaining all rights to any
improvements. 29 Lopez later formed a venture, HAL, to develop
a competing software program based on a derivative version of
GUS’s original software.30 GUS claimed that HAL engaged in
“reverse passing off” by copying the ideas, concepts, structures,
and sequences embodied in its copyrighted work. In addition,
GUS claimed copyright infringement but was unable to bring
forth sufficient evidence to support its burden of proof.31
<14>

In rejecting GUS’s “reverse passing off” claim, the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found Dastar’s reasoning
controlling, despite some differences between Dastar and the
situation at hand. 32 In Dastar, the material alleged to be
passed off had fallen into the public domain and the Supreme
Court found compelling reasons not to recognize a claim that
would have limited the public’s ability to utilize public material.
In contrast, none of the parties disputed the fact that GUS held
a valid copyright on its software.
<15>

The Fifth Circuit did not limit Dastar’s holding to cases in

which the product has entered the public domain, but rather
relied on copyright as the sole mechanism to protect GUS’s
interest in its software. In essence, the court found that GUS’s
Lanham Act claim of “reverse passing off” was simply a claim
that HAL has infringed its copyright.33 GUS was not claiming
that HAL had taken tangible copies of its software, removed its
trademark and resold the software as HAL’s own. 34 As a result,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary dismissal of GUS’s Lanham
Act claim. 35

B. Textbooks – Zyla v. Wadsworth, Div. of Thomson Corp.
<16>

In Zyla v. Wadsworth, Div. of Thomson Corp., a person

claiming to be the co-author of a college textbook brought an
action against the lead author and publisher (“Thomson”)
alleging multiple claims, including copyright infringement and
“reverse passing off” under the Lanham Act. 36 The claimed coauthor, Gail Zyla, had worked on the second and third editions
of the textbook and received attribution. 37 Later, after growing
unhappy with the progress of the project Zyla withdrew from
the fourth edition project and stated that her work in the new
edition was not to be used without her permission. 38 Despite
her request, Zyla’s work was included in the new edition and
used without permission. 39
<17>

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that

Zyla had assigned her copyrights in the fourth edition to
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Thomson and by doing so she was precluded from any claim of
copyright infringement. 40 Zyla argued, with respect to the
Lanham Act claim, that the acknowledgments section of the new
edition was “likely to cause confusion … as to the origin … of
the goods” because it implicitly represented that her work was
not included in the new edition.41 The court found Dastar
controlling on this issue and affirmed summary judgment. The
court acknowledged the catch 22 identified in Dastar and
reasoned that if Zyla had been credited with her role in the new
edition, then Zyla would likely have a false attribution claim
against Thomson because of her express withdrawal from the
project. 42 The court further embraced Dastar’s reasoning that
“origin” only applies to the producer of tangible goods (i.e.
Thomson) and that “claims of false authorship should be
pursued under copyright law.”43 Having exhausted her
copyright remedies, Zyla could not turn to the Lanham Act for
broader protection.44

C. Tables – Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Corp.
<18>

In Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Corp., the

plaintiff, Bretford Manufacturing (“Bretford”) sued Smith System
Manufacturing (“Smith System”) under the Lanham Act for trade
dress infringement and “reverse passing off.”45 Bretford had
been the exclusive producer of a particular type of computer
table in the years between 1990 and 1997.46 In 1997,
however, Smith System began making sales of a knock-off
table. 47 Bretford claimed that Smith System had committed
“reverse passing off” by using part of Bretford’s table in a
sample table, which was subsequently used to solicit sales. 48
<19>

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, relying

on Dastar, held that Bretford could not maintain a “reverse
passing off” claim because Smith validly identified itself as the
originator of the final marketable product. 49 The court noted
that a claim of “false origin” does not apply when a
manufacturer incorporates subassemblies or components from
others into a final tangible product sold in the marketplace.
Further, the court recognized that “[n]o one makes a product
from scratch” and that the Lanham Act “does not condemn the
way in which all products are made.”50 This decision applies
Dastar beyond the confines of communicative works and
illustrates the breadth of that decision. This appears to lead to
the conclusion that “reverse passing off” has been narrowed to
include only the act of stripping a final product of its identifying
mark and palming it off as one’s own. The Supreme Court
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recognized this limited remedy when it stated that a “claim
would be undoubtedly sustained if Dastar had bought some of
New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them as
its own.” 51

CONCLUSION
<20>

Dastar holds that “origin” in the context of § 43(a) of the

Lanham Act applies to the manufacturer or producer of tangible
goods. In Dastar, however, the goods in question were
communicative works that had fallen out of copyright. It was
unclear whether the holding in Dastar would also apply in the
context of copyrighted works or goods that are not of a
communicative nature. In the wake of Dastar, several cases
clarified the broad reach of the Dastar decision. These cases
illustrate that Dastar applies to a wide range of communicative
works, including screenplays, textbooks and computer software,
as well as non-communicative goods such as furniture. In
addition, Dastar applies to works that have fallen into the public
domain as well as those protected under valid copyrights. 52 In
sum, Dastar has significantly narrowed the scope of “reverse
passing off.”

53

An actor, such as the one in Smith v. Montoro,

may no longer rely on a claim of “reverse passing off” to
provide greater protection than that provided by copyright. What
remains actionable then under a “reverse passing off” theory
appears to be the act of complete appropriation of another’s
products, stripping off the identifying marks, and then selling
the product as one’s own.
<< Top
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